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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE JEOPARDY
AND THE DANGEROUS DRUG TAX
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurti
Ct. 1937 (1994)
I.

Ranch, 114 S.

INTRODUCTION

In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,' the Supreme
Court addressed whether the punitive nature of Montana's Dangerous
Drug Tax constituted a second punishment for double jeopardy purposes.2 The Court held that the standard it announced five years earlier in United States v. HalpeyB for determining whether a civil penalty
4
constituted a second punishment did not apply in the case of a tax.
Nonetheless, the Court found that Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax
violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the Act had
an obvious deterrent purpose and imposed a high tax rate predicated
on the commission of a crime based on goods which the taxpayer no
5
longer possessed.
The Court left open the possibility that the State of Montana
could assess a tax of the same or even greater magnitude under its
statutory scheme if brought in the same proceeding as the criminal
sanction. 6 It further left open the possibility that, if the tax preceded
the criminal prosecution, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar the
criminal prosecution. 7 This particularly unsatisfying result raises the
question of whether there is a better analysis to apply than double
jeopardy.
This Note explains the confusion surrounding the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution aspects of traditional double jeopardy protection. Then, this Note argues that the Supreme Court
inappropriately expanded the scope of the DoubleJeopardy Clause by
1 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
2 Id. at 1945.
3 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
4 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944.
5 Id. at 1946-48.
6 Id. at 1945.
7 As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Kurth Ranch, "we are unwilling to take the
strong (and not particularly healthful) medicine that we poured out for ourselves in Halper
...[since] many cases... will demand much more of us: disallowing criminal punishment
because a civil sanction has already been imposed." Id. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ignoring the distinction between multiple punishments and prosecutions to compensate for some of the Clause's limitations. This Note
then concludes that the Supreme Court did not need to expand
double jeopardy protection, because other areas of the Constitution
already adequately compensate for these limitations. The Court could
have achieved more satisfying and practical results by first acknowledging the limits of Double Jeopardy protection, and then turning to
the Excessive Fines Clause for additional protection.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

DRUG TAXES GENERALLY

Essentially, a drug tax allows the government to collect from the
"taxpayer," in a civil action, an amount which it calculates as a function of the street value of the substances in the taxpayer's possession
or a flat fee per unit of the substance. Until 1969, the federal government taxed the transfer of marijuana pursuant to the Federal Marijuana Tax Act.8 In Leary v. United States,9 however, the Supreme Court
declared certain provisions of the Act unconstitutional on self-incrimination grounds 10 and set the stage for the Act's repeal in 1970. Many
states implemented their own versions of the federal drug tax, but
carefully structured their legislation to avoid the self-incrimination
problems that led to the downfall of the federal tax."
At least twenty-six states have, at one time or another, enacted
some form of a dangerous drug tax. 12 These tax provisions usually
take one of three forms: (1) tax stamps; (2) excise taxes; or (3) licensing fees.
Tax stamps constitute the most popular method of assessing the
drug tax. Under this scheme, the dealer must purchase stamps prior
8 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-4776 (1964) (repealed 1970).
9 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
10 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person

shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CoNST.
amend. V. Congress had structured the Federal Marijuana Tax so that dealers had to register their names and places of business with the Internal Revenue Service. The I.R.S., in
turn, made such information available to federal and state law enforcement officials. As
the Court held in Leafy, this lack of confidentiality violated the Fifth Amendment. Leary,
395 U.S. at 18.
11 But see State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986) (invalidating a drug tax on selfincrimination grounds); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888 (Idaho 1991) (same); People v.
Duleff, 515 P.2d 1239 (Colo. 1973) (same).
12 These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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to any sale and affix them to the packaging of the product. 13 Most
4
systems allow the dealer to make the stamp purchase anonymously.'
Enforcement actions following non-compliance under these schemes
have the potential to raise considerable amounts of revenue. 15
Unlike tax stamps, excise taxes' 6 offer no mechanism for advance

payment. In fact, one particular state imposes the tax only after the
state convicts the drug dealer. 17 Finally, two states have imposed an
occupational licensing fee on drug dealers.' 8 In addition to the li-

censing fee, such states also impose a tax. Nevada allows the drug
dealer to purchase the license anonymously.'
B.

9

HISTORY OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND ATTACKS AGAINST DRUG TAXES

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."20 The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to prohibit
both multiple prosecutionsand multiple punishments.2 ' A multiple pros-

ecutions violation might occur, for example, where after an acquittal
for murder, a prosecutor sought to try the same defendant for manslaughter. A multiple punishments violation, on the other hand,
might occur where the sentencing court imposed both fine and im-

prisonment, but the legislature had only authorized one or the other.
13 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-17A-10 (1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.7-103 (1994); IDAHO
CODE § 63-4204 (Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5203 (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 297D.10 (West 1991); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 372A.090 (Michie Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 450.4 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-49-11 (Supp. 1994); TEx. TAX CODE
ANN. § 159.003 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-19-104 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 139.89 (West Supp. 1992).
14 Despite provisions allowing for anonymity, compliance with tax stamp statutes has
been virtually nonexistent in most states. The bulk of the revenue raised by these states
comes, not from tax stamp sales, but from non-compliance penalty provisions. See Frank A.
Racaniello, State DrugTaxes: A Tax We Can't Afford, 23 RUTGERS LJ. 657 (1992) (examining
the ability of state drug taxes to raise revenue and the ethical dilemmas associated with
imposing a tax where compliance is not expected).
15 Colorado, for example, imposes a penalty for non-compliance of up to three times
the amount of the tax due. COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-28.7-107 (1994).
16 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.0505 (West 1989).
17 ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4434 (West 1990).
18 AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01 (1991); NEv. R v. STAT. ANN. § 372A.070 (Michie
1993).
19 See, eg., Nv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 372A.070 (Michie 1993). But seeAmiz. Rv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-1203.01(a) (1991) (requiring an application form to accompany the licensing fee).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 As the commonly quoted language in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969), recites, the DoubleJeopardy Clause "protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Id.
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Each of these prohibitions protects a distinct interest. 22
The protection against multiple prosecutionsassures the finality of
the first prosecution. 23 As the Court noted in Green v. United States,24
the multiple prosecutions prohibition prevents a state from making
"repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity ... .,,25 On the other hand, the prohibition against multiple punishments protects the defendant's interest in avoiding multiple
penalties by ensuring that the penalty imposed does not exceed that
26
which the legislature has authoized.
Until recently, the Supreme Court frequently ignored the distinction between these two interests. 27 As a result, much of the double
jeopardy jurisprudence remains jumbled and haphazard. 28 Prior to
Missouriv. Hunter,2 9 the Supreme Court applied the test announced in
Blockburger v. United States3 0 to both multiple prosecutions and multiple punishment cases. According to this standard, a statute which authorizes a second punishment or prosecution -will pass double
jeopardy scrutiny only if each statutory provision "requires proof of a
3
fact which the other does not." '
In Hunter, the Supreme Court first acknowledged that courts
must apply separate tests to evaluate each of these interests for double
jeopardy purposes.3 2 The state had charged and sentenced the defendant in Hunter in one proceeding with "armed criminal action"
and "first-degree robbery."3 3 In short, the Supreme Court held that
the cumulative punishments did not violate double jeopardy, even
though the statutes proscribing this conduct could not pass the Block4 In announcing a new standard for multiple punishburger test.M
22 Elizabeth S.Jahncke, United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the DoubleJeop-

ardy and Excssive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 112, 115-18 (1991).
23 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978);
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); United States v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479
(1971); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
24 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
25 Id. at 187-88.
26 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
27 See George C. Thomas III, A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishmen 47 U. PrrT. L Ruv.
1 (1985).
28 MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 199 (1969) (discussing the punishmentprosecution confusion).
29 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
30 284 U.S. 299 (1982).
31 Id. at 304.
32 Hunter,459 U.S. at 866.
33 Id. at 360-62.
34 Id. at 368. The statutes proscribing "armed criminal action" and "first-degree rob-
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ments, the Court held that "[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences
imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more
than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." 5 As such, Blockburges blanket
prohibition of multiple sentences for the same conduct now supplies
nothing more than a rule of statutory construction, which the legislature could eliminate.3 6 In the wake of Hunter, the Blockburgerstandard
retained its vitality only for cases involving multiple prosecutions. 3 7
The multiple prosecutions standard differs where the second
state action is civil or not overtly criminal in nature.38 Here, a court
must first address the question of whether the second proceeding constitutes a second criminal prosecution.3 9 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,4 the Supreme Court first examined the difference between
criminal proceedings-which serve punitive purposes-and civil proceedings-which serve other, non-punitiveinterests. 4' Factors relevant
to determining when a nominally "civil" proceeding becomes a "criminal" prosecution for double jeopardy purposes include: (1) whether
the so-called "civil" proceeding involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether any sanction through the proceeding has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether liability under the
proceeding arises only after a finding of scienter; (4) whether the proceeding promotes the traditional alms of punishment-retribution
and deterrence; (5) whether the sanction imposed relates to behavior
already established as a crime; (6) whether the proceeding has any
non-punitive purpose; and (7) whether the proceeding imposes an
excessive sanction in relation to its non-punitive purpose. 42 If a court
applies these factors and finds that the civil proceeding constitutes a
second criminal action, it must then apply the Blockburger rule to evaluate the elements of each proceeding.
The Court later augmented the Kennedy standard in United States
v. Ward13 when it held that, in evaluating multiple prosecution cases,
courts must first address a separate threshold question before raising
bery" could not pass the Blockburgertest because the elements of each offense were substantially
the same. Id.
85 Id. at 366.

36 Id. at 366-67 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980)).
37 See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (affirming the Blockburgerrule for successive
prosecutions cases).
38 See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
39 Id. at 362.

40 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
41 Id. at 168.
42 Id. at 168-69.

43 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
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the seven Kennedy factors. 44 Specifically, a court must first determine
whether the legislature either expressly or impliedly indicated a preference for either the "criminal" or "civil" labels.4 5 If the legislature
intended to use the "civil" label, a court should apply the Kennedy factors to determine whether the action operates as a criminal prosecution notwithstanding that label. 6 In evaluating these factors, "only
the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a
statute" for double jeopardy purposes. 4 7
C.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY APPLIED TO NON-TAX SANCTIONS

Most of the double jeopardyjurisprudence in this area relates not
to the constitutionality of a tax, but rather to the constitutionality of a
civil penalty. Thus, the lower federal courts in Kurth Ranch48 and several state courts49 have applied civil penalty double jeopardy analysis,
as enunciated in United States v. Halper,50 to evaluate taxes.
In Halper, the Supreme Court announced a standard for determining when a civil penalty constitutes a second punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. 5 1 Halperinvolved violations of the criminal
false claims statute,52 which imposed criminal sanctions as well as a
civil penalty of $2000 for each violation.5 3 The United States had
charged the defendant with making sixty-five separate claims for reimbursement of twelve dollars from the government for medical services
54
rendered which were, in fact, worth only three dollars.
After the court in the criminal case sentenced the defendant to
two years imprisonment and fined him $5000, 55 the government insti44

Id. at 248-49.

45

Id. at 248.

Id. at 24849. Note that the Court decided both Ward and Kennedy before it began to
recognize the distinction between multiple punishments and multiple prosecutions.
47 Id. at 249 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
48 Kurth Ranch v. Department of Revenue of the State of Mont., 145 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1990); Kurth Ranch v. Department of Revenue of the State of Mont., No. CV-90-084GF, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991); Kurth Ranch v. Department of Revenue of
46

the State of Mont., 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993).
49 See, e.g., Sorensen v. State, 836 P.2d 29, 30 (Mont. 1992); Rehg v. Illinois Dep't of
Revenue, 152 Ill.
2d 504, 523 (1992).
50 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
51 Id. at 448.
52 Id. at 437. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982), imposes a fine on a
person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved." The Act imposes liability in the
amount of a $2000 civil penalty plus an amount equal to two times the damages sustained
by the government and costs of the action. Id.
53 Id. at 437.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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tuted a separate civil action to collect the $2000 penalty for each of his
sixty-five violations. 56 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
$130,000 aggregate civil penalty constituted an unconstitutional second punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5 7 Because the
penalty was more than 220 times greater than the damages suffered by
the government, the Court held that the civil penalty lost its characteristics as a remedial sanction and performed the traditional deterrent
and retributive functions of punishment.5 8
Arguably, the Court could have reached the same decision in
Halperby applying the Excessive Fines Clause and without resorting to
double jeopardy analysis.5 9 Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Kurth Ranch, the sanction in Halperseemed more like an unconstitutional excessive fine than a second jeopardy.60
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY"

Six members of the extended Kurth family owned and operated a
mixed grain and livestock farm in central Montana. 6 1 In October of
1987, federal and state law enforcement personnel raided the Kurth
farm and seized harvested marijuana, live marijuana plants, and several forms of other marijuana derivatives, including hash tar and hash
oil.

62

After arresting the Kurths, the State of Montana charged them
with criminal offenses, including criminal possession of drugs with in56 Id. at 438.
57 Id. at 44849.
58 Id.
59 For an in-depth look at the Halperdecision and the reasons why excessive fines analysis would have been more appropriate than double jeopardy analysis, see Jahncke, supra

note 22, at 142-47.
60 Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 n.2 (1994)
(Scalia,J., dissenting). Justice Scalia suggested that perhaps the reason the Court in Halper
did not recognize the lurking excessive fines justification for its holding was that it was not
until after Halperthat the Excessive Fines Clause was "rescued from obscurity" in the civil
context. Id.
61 Id. at 1942. The members of the Kurth family include: Richard M. Kurth, his wife
Judith M. Kurth, their son Douglas M. Kurth, their daughter Cindy K. Halley, Douglas' wife
Rhonda I. Kurth, and Cindy's husband Clayton H. Halley. Id.
62 Id. Specifically, the Drug Tax Report, compiled after the raid, included:
Item #1: 2155 marijuana plants in various stages of growth,
Item #2: 7 gallons of hash oil,
Item #3: 4 bags of marijuana at two pounds each,
Item #4- 65/one gram vials of hash tar,
Item #5: 14 baby food size jars of hash tar,
Item #6: 7 pint jars of hash tar,
Item #7: 1 bag of marijuana, 1/4 pound,
Item #8: 5 plastic bags marijuana, total 2230 grams,
Item #9: approximately 100 pounds of marijuana stems, leaves, parts, etc.
Id. at 1942 n.7.
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tent to sell and conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to sell. 63 Each

member of the Kurth family eventually pleaded guilty to at least one
of these charges as part of a plea agreement. 4 Concurrently with the
criminal prosecutions, the State of Montana also initiated a civil forfeiture action, confiscating cash and equipment totalling approximately
$18,000.65
Then, the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) initiated a
separate proceeding to collect a tax assessed pursuant to Montana's
Dangerous Drug Tax Act. 66 The Montana Act allows the DOR to levy
a tax on possession or storage of certain dangerous drugs. 67 According to DOR regulations, promulgated under the Montana Act, the arresting officer must file the drug tax return within seventy-two hours
of the arrest. 68 This return, which the taxpayer may or may not have
signed, must contain an itemized list of the quantities and types of
69
drugs seized.
The Montana Act also provides the following formula for calculating the tax:
(2) [t]he tax on possession and storage of dangerous drugs is the greater
of:
(a) ten percent of the assessed market value of the drugs as determined by the department; or
(b) (i) $100.00 per ounce of marijuana, as defined in 50-32-101,
or its derivatives, as determined by the aggregate weight of the
substance seized;
(ii) $250.00 per ounce of hashish, as defined in 50-32-101 as determined by the aggregate weight of the substance seized ....

70

Applying this formula, the DOR assessed a tax totalling $864,940.99
63 Id. The State also charged Richard Kurth with criminal sale of dangerous drugs,
criminal possession of a dangerous drug with intent to sell, solicitation to commit the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous drug with intent to sell, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Id. at 1942 n.8.
64 Kurth Ranch v. Department of Revenue of the State of Mont., 145 B.R. 61, 64-65
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). The State trial court sentenced the members of the Kurth family
to the following terms:
Richard Kurth: 20 years imprisonment with 15 years suspended on each of three
counts and 5 years on a fourth count,
Judith Kurth: 5 years imprisonment with 4 years suspended,
Douglas Kurth: 20 years imprisonment with all 20 suspended,
Clayton Halley 10 years imprisonment with all 10 suspended,
Rhonda Kurth and Cindy Halley- sentence deferred.
Id.
65 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942.
66 Id.
67 MONT. CODE ANN.

§§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1993).
68 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941-42 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-113(1) (1987)).
69 Id.
70 MONT. CODE

Am4. § 15-25-111(2) (1993).
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on the harvested marijuana, live plants, hash tar, and hash oil. 7 1
On 9 September 1988, the Kurths filed a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy reorganization.7 2 In response, the DOR filed a claim with
the trustee in bankruptcy for the total assessment. 73 The Kurths objected to the claim on the basis that (1) the tax calculations were arbitrary and capricious and (2) the tax violated the Fifth Amendment
proscription against double jeopardy.74
The bankruptcy court disallowed the DOR's claim based on state
law and double jeopardy grounds. 75 The court first invalidated the
taxes on hash tar, hash oil, and live plants as a matter of state law
because the DOR had no basis for determining the fair market value
of these items. 76 The court held that a tax based on ten percent of an
unascertainable market value was arbitrary and capricious.

77

Second, with respect to the remaining $181,100 tax on harvested
marijuana, the court determined that, while the amount was not arbitrary or capricious, 7 8 the tax violated the prohibition against double
jeopardy. 79 In support of this conclusion, the court relied principally
on the reasoning in United States v. Halper.8" The court found that the
tax, while purporting to raise revenue, in effect constituted a second
criminal punishment.8 1 Hence, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
71 Kurth Ranch v. Department of Revenue of the State of Mont., 145 B.R. 61, 68
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). The total tax of $864,940.99 consists of the principal amount for
harvested marijuana ($181,100.00), live marijuana plants ($213,345.00), hash oil
($224,000.00), hash tar ($29,500.00), interest ($145,324.24), and penalties ($63,591.75 reduced by $30,000.00 which the State had already collected from the Kurths). These assessments varied from 80% to as much as 800% of the fair market value of the particular type
of product. Id.
72 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1943.
73 Id.
74 Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 69, 73. Thus, the bankruptcy court oddly became the court
in which the Kurths challenged the constitutionality of the Montana Drug Tax Act.
75 Id. at 76.
76 Id. at 69. Under Montana law, a court reviewing a tax will not substitute its judgement for that of DOR officials in evaluating the tax, but the court "will intercede.., when
it appears that the valuation fixed by the taxing officials is so grossly excessive as to amount
to arbitrary action or to be inconsistent with the exercise of an honestjudgment." Id. at 69
(citing Danforth v. Livingston, 23 Mont. 558 (1900); International Business Mach. Corp. v.
Lewis and Clark County, 111 Mont. 384 (1941); Investors Sec. Co. v. Moore, 113 Mont. 400
(1942)).
77 Id.
78 Unlike the hash tar, hash oil, and live plants, for which any assigned market value
was speculative at best, the street value of the harvested, saleable marijuana was readily
ascertainable and thus, neither arbitrary nor capricious. Id. at 72.
79 Id. at 76.
80 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
81 Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 75 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448
(1989)).
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its collection.8 2 The court noted that the tax served the traditional
goals of punishment-deterrence and retribution-and did not relate
to the recovery of the actual costs the government incurred in investi83
gating and prosecuting the Kurths.
The DOR did not appeal the bankruptcy court's decision that the
taxes on hash tar, hash oil, and live marijuana plants were arbitrary
and capricious.8 4 It did, however, appeal to the District Court of Montana the decision that the $181,100 tax on harvested marijuana violated the Kurth's double jeopardy protection. 85 The district court
affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court relying on identical
8 6
reasoning.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit also affirmed, 87 but changed the
reasoning slightly. The Ninth Circuit held that the penalty was punitive in nature, not because it did not fairly approximate the costs that
the government incurred, but only because it served the traditional
aims of punishment, namely, retribution and deterrence. 88 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 89. to determine
whether the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax, as applied against the
Kurths, constituted an unconstitutional second punishment. 90
IV.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, 91 reached the same conclusion as the lower courts, but departed markedly from their reasoning
by rejecting as wholly inappropriate the standard enunciated in
Halper, while announcing an entirely new standard applicable to a
82 Id.
83 Id. at 75-76. As Justice Stevens later pointed out in his opinion, the Bankruptcy
Court impliedly failed to recognize the distinction between a tax and a cidvil penalty and

subsequently failed to recognize that the two mechanisms have different goals which may
require different tests. See infra notes 99 to 102 and accompanying text.
84 See Kurth Ranch v. Department of Revenue of the State of Mont., No. CV-90-084-GF,
1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991).
85 Id. at *1. In addition to the $181,100 tax on harvested marijuana, the State sought
interest and penalties which had accrued on the principal, bringing the total claim against
the Kurths to $208,105. Kurth Ranch v. Department of Revenue of the State of Mont., 986,
F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1993).
86 Kurth Ranch, No. CV-90-084-GF, 1991 WL 365065 at *4.
87 Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308.
88 Id. at 1310-11.
89 Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
90 Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (1994).
91 Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined Justice Stevens to form a
majority.
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tax. 92
1.

Rejecting the Halper Standard

The Court began with the premise that the government may use
criminal fines, civil penalties, civil forfeitures, and even taxes to generate funds, deter certain types of behavior, or impose burdens on individuals. 93 However, the Court noted that the particular label that the
legislature has attached to each of these mechanisms does not alone
determine the sanction's true criminal or civil nature.9 4 For example,
the Court recognized that a sanction nominally designated as a civil
sanction might effectively impose a criminal punishment. 95 Therefore, as the Court concluded, it must always focus upon whether the
sanction constitutes a second punishment, not the label which the legislature has placed upon it.96
Justice Stevens began his analysis by describing the standard the
Court had articulated five years earlier in Halper for determining
when a civil penalty may effectively serve as a second punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. 97 According to this standard, a civil penalty may act as a second criminal punishment when it would be unfair
to characterize it as remedial. 98
Relying on the distinction between a civil penalty and a tax, Justice Stevens rejected the Halperanalysis, because Halperinvolved only
a civil penalty and not a tax. 99 The Court concluded that taxes fundamentally differ from other mechanisms in that they have a revenueraising purpose. 100 Civil penalties, on the other hand, serve to restore
the government to its prior position. 10 1 According to the Court,
Halpers analysis of the relationships between the costs incurred by the
government and the penalty assessed did not address the question of
whether a tax may act as a second punishment because, unlike civil
10 2
penalties, taxes do not serve a remedial purpose.
2. Formulating a New Standard
After disposing of the Halperline of reasoning, the Court devel92 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945-48.
93 Id. at 1945.
94 Id. at 1946.

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
Id. at 1945.
Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 1944.
Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1945.
Id.
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oped a new test, consisting of four factors, to determine whether a tax
03
may, in effect, become an unconstitutional second punishment.
First, Justice Stevens found the high tax rate of Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax relevant to determining its nature as a second punishment. 0 4 Montana taxed the various types of marijuana seized from
the Kurths at an average rate of 400% of their street value, which the
Court found unrivaled when compared to taxes assessed on legal
goods. 10 5 The Court noted that while the tax rate alone did not determine the nature of the tax, the 400% figure was at least consistent
06
with the aims of punishment'1
Second, the Court found the tax's obvious deterrent purpose
07
consistent with a punitive sanction, but also not solely dispositive.'
The Court noted that Montana implemented the tax, at least in part,
to deter the possession of marijuana and to provide for anticrime initiatives by burdening violators.' 0 8 The DOR argued that governmental bodies properly impose many taxes, such as those on cigarettes or
alcohol, to deter certain conduct, criminal or otherwise. 10 9 To address this argument, the Court drew a distinction between three types
of taxes."10 First, the government imposes purely deterrent taxes on
illegal activities, such as the possession of marijuana, to control behavior.1" Second, the government imposes purely revenue-raising taxes,
such as income taxes, despite their effects on behavior to fund general
governmental operations. 112 Third, the government can establish a
"mixed-motive" tax, such as the one imposed on cigarettes, "both to
deter behavior and raise money." 1 3 With respect to this latter category, the government must balance its interest in deterring the disfavored behavior-for example, smoking-against any benefits of the
product "such as creating employment, satisfying consumer demand
and generating tax revenues" that may outweigh the harm that the
14
product causes."
According to the Court, the illegality of an activity cannot provide
103

Id.at 1946-48.

104 Id. at 1946.
105 Id. at 1946 n.17. The State seized saleable marijuana with an estimated street value
of $46,000 and assessed a tax of $181,000. Id.

106 Id. at 1946.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1946 n.18. (citing the preamble to Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax to demonstrate Montana's intent to deter the drug trade).
109 Id. at 1946.
110 Id. at 1947.
III Id.
112 Id.

113 Id.
114 Id.

948

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 85

the basis for a "mixed-motive tax." 115 The "revenue" raising justification vanishes because increasing the amount of the criminal penalty
may equally serve the same function.11 6 Without this justification, the
only remaining motive for the tax is deterrence. 117
The Court emphasized that the high rate of tax and obvious deterrent purpose do not, by themselves, indicate that the tax assumed a
punitive character."l 8 Because the Court had previously challenged
the legitimacy of each of these two factors alone, the Court added two
more factors to consider in conjunction with the others.n 9 ,.
As the third factor, the Court noted that when the liability for the
tax arises only following the commission of a crime, the tax may
amount to punishment. 120 Applying this factor to Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax, the Court concluded that not only does Montana's statutory scheme predicate liability on criminal activity, but the
assessment itself and the obligation to file the tax return do not arise
until the state arrests an individual for the very conduct that gives rise
to the tax.121
Fourth, the Court noted that the DOR assesses the tax based on
possession or storage of goods which the taxpayer no longer possesses. 122 Since this method of taxation "departs so far from normal
revenue laws" and applies only with respect to criminals, the tax has
123
an "unmistakable punitive character."
In closing, Justice Stevens reiterated that the Halperstandard did
not apply to the present case because taxes stand apart from civil penalties.' 24 He speculated, however, that even if Halper had been appropriate, the tax would still have been considered a second punishment,
because Montana presented no evidence of the costs it incurred in
investigating, arresting, and prosecuting the Kurths to justify the
125
amount of the tax it imposed upon them.
115 Id.
116 Id.

117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1946-47 (citing United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (upholding a
harsh $100 per ounce tax on marijuana); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513
(1937) (holding that a deterrent purpose and high rate of taxation did not necessarily
render a $200 tax on firearms dealers punitive in nature)).
120 Id. at 1947.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1948. Indeed, as the Court noted, the goods presumably have been destroyed
by the time the DOR assesses the tax. Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.

125 Id. According to the Halperstandard, the purpose of a civil sanction is to allow the
government to recover the costs it incurred as a result of investigating and prosecuting the
activity. Since it may be difficult if not impossible to estimate these costs, the government
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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT

In his dissent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist agreed that the Halperline
of reasoning did not apply to a tax statute. 126 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
also agreed that the proper inquiry is whether the tax has the effect of
imposing a second punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 1 27 He
objected, however, to the "hodgepodge of criteria-many of which
have been squarely rejected by our previous decisions"-that the
128
Court employed to evaluate the tax's punitive character.
Specifically, ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that the high rate of
taxation or obvious deterrent purpose do not lend any support to the
conclusion that the tax is punitive in nature. 129 He cited cases, which
the Court mentioned only in passing, to indicate that the unlawfulness
of an activity does not prevent its taxation and to show affirmatively
that the Court has upheld taxes with purely deterrent purposes in the
past' 3 0° Chief Justice Rehnquist cited precedent which contradicted
the Court's proposition that a tax on illegal activities cannot exist as a
"mixed-motive tax." 13 1
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist disputed the Court's conclusion
32
that Montana conditions tax liability on the commission of a crime.1
He claimed that the requirement that the arresting officer file the tax
return within seventy-two hours of an individual's arrest "merely acknowledges the practical realities involved in taxing an illegal activity."' 3 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist further argued against the relevance
of the final factor of the Court's standard-that the taxpayer no
longer possesses the goods being taxed: "[slurely the Court is not
suggesting that the State must permit the Kurths to keep the contra134
band in order to tax its possession."
may attempt to exact liquidated damages in the absence of a showing of actual damages.
Given the great deference given to legislatures, this method of cost recovery has been
referred to as "rough remedialjustice." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989).

Where the amount of penalty bears no rational relationship to these costs, the penalty may
lose its non-punitive characteristic-cost recovery-and perform the functions of punishment. Id.
126 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct.
127 Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist,
128 Id. at 1949 (Rehnquist,
129 Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist,

at 1949 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
C.J., dissenting).

C.J., dissenting).
C.J., dissenting).

130 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44
(1968); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935)).
131 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44

(1950), where the Supreme Court upheld a tax on marijuana as a "mixed-motive tax" reasoning that "a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages or

even definitely deters the activity taxed").
132 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
'33
'34

Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1951 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the Court's conclusion
that the tax rate is "unrivaled" by other taxes.13 5 In comparison to
cigarette taxes, for example, the 400% rate is not that extraordinary
given the traditional deference to the state legislatures in the area of
taxation and the fact that large portions of the illegal drug trade will
6
escape taxation.' 3
C.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT

In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor dismissed the
distinction the Court and Chief Justice Rehnquist made between a
civil penalty and a tax.' 3 7 In the absence of such a distinction, Justice

O'Connor applied an analysis similar to that in Halper.13 8
Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Scalia's dissent that a "civil
proceeding following a criminal prosecution simply is not a second
jeopardy'," but recognized that a state may try to mask a criminal
punishment under the guise of a civil sanction to circumvent protections afforded in the Bill of Rights. 13 9 As such, double jeopardy scrutiny may apply to any civil sanction if it exacts a punishment.1 40
Justice O'Connor adopted the standard that both the lower
courts and the Court in Halperused-that the sanction may become
punitive when the amount of the tax is "'overwhelmingly disproportionate"' to the costs incurred by the government as a result of the
unlawful behavior. 141 Justice O'Connor reached the opposite result,
however, by finding the amount of tax in the instant case reasonable
in light of the huge costs that the state incurs to detect, investigate,
and prosecute drug offenders. 14 2 Justice O'Connor introduced "readily available statistics" from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the
Montana Board of Crime Control to show that the state and federal
governments spent approximately $27 billion in 1991 for drug enforcement and that Montana could directly attribute at least $120,000
to the "apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration" of the Kurths
alone. 143
135 Id. at 1952 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
136 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

138 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

139 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449
(1989)).
142 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 1953-54 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Justice O'Connor, however, fails to explain
why these "readily available statistics" were not available to the lower courts or why the
DOR never argued them.
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Justice O'Connor posited that, given the impracticability of attempting to determine the exact costs attributable to each drug-related offense, the Court should allow Montana to exact liquidated
damages. 4 4 The Montana Dangerous Drug Tax performs precisely
this function.145 Montana's legislature has established $100 per ounce
of marijuana as its reasonable estimate of the amount of damages the
State may suffer.' 46 Justice O'Connor also justified the reasonableness
of this amount by pointing out that twenty-two other states have chosen the same dollar value as their estimate of liquidated damages in
their dru' tax statutes. 47
Justice O'Connor explained that her application of the Halper
standard produced a different result from the lower courts because
those courts misplaced the burden of demonstrating that the tax approximated costs incurred by the State.1 48 The Ninth Circuit held
that "allowing the state to impose this tax, without any showing of
some rough approximation of its actual damages and costs, would be
sanctioning a penalty which Halperprohibits." 49 Justice O'Connor argued that this standard prematurely places the burden of proof on the
State to justify its tax. 150 According to the holding in Halper,the defendant must first make some showing that no rational relationship
exists between the amount of the sanction and the costs incurred by
the government.' 5 ' If the defendant meets this requirement, the bur52
den then shifts to the State to justify the amount of the sanction.'
Justice O'Connor concluded that, since the Kurths had made no
showing that the tax did not relate to Montana's non-punitive objectives, the State had no obligation to present any evidence supporting
its tax. 155

D." JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT

Justice Scalia's dissent' 5 4 questioned the very nature of the
DoubleJeopardy Clause and concluded that "jeopardy"refers not to a
55
criminal punishment, but only to a criminal prosecution.'
144

Id. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

145

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

146

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

147

Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting).

148

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

'49 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
151 Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting) In essence, there is a presumption in favor of the state

that a tax statute is constitutional. Id.
152 Id. at 1954-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
154 Justice Thomas joined this dissent.
155 Id. at 1955 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia noted that legislation that imposes two sanctions for
the same conduct has been common throughout American history,
including the period when the drafters of the Fifth Amendment submitted it for ratification. 15 6 Justice Scalia found it implausible that the
drafters of the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit second punishments as they simultaneously enacted legislation authorizing those
57
types of sanctions.1
Justice Scalia traced the long-standing, mistaken belief, relied
upon by the Court, that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
second punishments to Ex Parte Lange.158 The Supreme Court decided that case, which involved both a prison term and a fine for theft
of mail bags, not on double jeopardy grounds, but purely based on
statutory construction.' 5 9 The statute in Lange authorized a maximum
prison sentence of two years ora maximum fine of $2000.160 Since the
lower court had imposed both, the sanctions violated the letter of the
statutory authorization. 16' Due process assures that a sentencing
court may impose punishment only to the extent the legislature authorized it.162 While the decision in Lange addressed both the common law and double jeopardy arguments in dicta, "[i]t is clear that
the Due Process Clause alone suffices to support the decision." 16 Justice Scalia argued that the Court erroneously repeated this dicta as a
holding in North Carolinav. Pearce,164 a frequently cited case regarding
the types of protections the Double Jeopardy Clause affords. 16 5
Justice Scalia reasoned that, since it does not matter whether the
government imposes the punishment through a criminal or civil forum, the Double Jeopardy Clause, as employed in Halper, merely
duplicates other constitutional protections.' 6 6 Justice Scalia argued
156 Id. at 1955-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317

U.S. 537, 555-56 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
157 Id. at 1956 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (citing United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537, 555-56 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
158 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Ex Parte Lange, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1874)).
159 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Since the sentencing court in Lange imposed both forms
of punishment where the legislature had authorized only prison or fine, it violated the
defendant's due process. Therefore, no double jeopardy inquiry was necessary to hold
Lange's sentence unconstitutional. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). For cases citing Pearce to support the proposition that
double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments, see United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1975).
165 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1956. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 1957. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that where a sanction has the effect of a punishment, the Due Process
Clause requires that the punishment lie within the legislatively authorized bounds. 167 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the
Excessive Fines Clause ensure that the legislature does not authorize
unreasonable bounds. 168 Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause affords
no punishment protection which these clauses of the Constitution do
not already adequately provide. 169 Doublejeopardy merely prevents a
prosecutor from bringing additional charges in a later proceeding. 7 0
Justice Scalia found the misconception that doublejeopardy protects against a second punishment particularly problematic, because
the sequence of the punishments should not matter.' 7 ' Under this
misconception, where a governmental body had already imposed a
civil punishment, the Double Jeopardy Clause would certainly bar future criminal proceedings. 7 2 By relying instead on the Due Process
Clause, Justice Scalia avoided this problem. 173 He concluded that
once a court determines that a state imposed a criminal tax through a
civil proceeding, such assessment would violate all of the criminal procedure protections' 74 of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including
the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses.' 7 5 On this basis, the
Court would invalidate the tax irrespective of whether it had followed
17 6
a criminal prosecution, without relying on double jeopardy analysis.
V. ANALYSS
The Court's analysis in Kurth Ranch confuses multiple punishments with multiple prosecution. 7 7 The double jeopardy confusion
Id. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167

170 Id. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 687
(1980)).
Id. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia,J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 1960 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
174 In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402-03 (1938), for example, the Court noted
that the following criminal procedure guarantees could be violated by bringing a criminal
action in a civil forum:
(1) In a criminal trial, liability must be determined by a jury, not by administrative
agency,
(2) In a criminal trial, the court may not direct a verdict against the defendant;
(3) In a criminal trial, the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
(4) In a criminal trial, the government may not appeal from an adverse decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
175 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
176 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'71
172

177

Justice Scalia's position that the DoubleJeopardy Clause protects only multiple pros-

ecutions, while the Due Process Clause protects multiple punishments is defensible, but

unnecessary to determine the outcome of this case. For arguments in accord with Scalia's
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perpetuated by the Halper decision and stemming from the punishment/prosecution misunderstanding explains in part the Court's decision. This Note argues that if the Court had separately applied the
Huntermultiple punishments rule and the Kennedy-Ward rule for multiple prosecutions, it would have reached a different conclusion on
the double jeopardy issue. Instead, by confusing the two doctrines,
the Court attempted to merge the two rules into a hybrid multiple
punishment rule that selectively incorporated elements of the Kennedy
test into punishment analysis. This type of jurisprudence, also employed in Halper, has clouded the double jeopardy issue further and
178
obscured the punishment-prosecution distinction.
This Note further argues that the Court could have applied the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to supply the additional protection not afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Under
Excessive Fines analysis, the Court could still have invalidated the tax
assessed against the Kurths.
A.

MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT PROTECTION

The Court's analysis centers almost entirely on multiple punishment. 179 The Court goes to great lengths to examine the nature of
the tax and the possible deterrent or retributive effects it may have.
This type of analysis flies directly in the face of the multiple punishments rule spelled out in Hunter. That rule allows multiple punishments to the extent that the legislature authorizes them, despite any
possible deterrent or retributive effects. 180 As such, the Court should
have limited its punishments inquiry to determining whether the
criminal punishment imposed against the Kurths and the tax assessed
view, see Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 19 (1978); Walter T. Fisher, DoubleJeapardy:
Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 UCLA L. REv. 81, 86-87 (1967). Under either the
Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause, the same rule applies in a multiple
punishment inquiry: a consecutive punishment is permissible if the legislature authorizes
it. By separating punishments from prosecutions in such a dramatic fashion, however,
Scalia may be attempting to give some much needed clarity to double jeopardy
jurisprudence.
178 As Justice Scalia remarks in his dissent, "[i]t is time to put the Hapergenie back in
the bottle," by once and for all separating multiple punishment analysis from multiple
prosecutions analysis to avoid further muddying of the double jeopardy waters. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179 The majority addressed the prosecution issue only by asserting the naked conclusion
that "[t]he proceeding Montana initiated to collect a tax on the possession of drugs was
the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in
jeopardy a second time." Id. at 1948. AsJustice Scalia noted in his dissent, this conclusion
must rest on the premise that any action which gives rise to a sanction which may be construed as punitive is criminal. In light of the Kennedy-Ward test, this premise is false. Id. at
1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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by the Department of Revenue, in fact, exceeded that which Montana's legislature had authorized.
Applying this analysis, the Court would have concluded that the
legislature had authorized both punishments and that therefore, the
tax did not violate the prohibition against multiple punishments.
Under the standard announced in Hunter, the Court's double jeopardy inquiry would go no further than whether the tax exceeded that
which Montana's legislature had duly prescribed.' 8 ' The preamble to
Montana's Dangerous Drug tax clearly indicates that the State's legislature intended to simultaneously allow both the criminal sanctions
and the tax.18 2 The preamble indicates that while the State of Montana does not wish to condone the illicit drug trade, it acknowledges
that the trade otherwise escapes taxation.' 8 3 Given the burdens the
trade has on the State's economy, Montana considers it appropriate
that those involved in the drug trade should bear some of these burdens. 84 Thus, Montana wishes to assess a tax on participants in the
drug trade in addition to the criminal sanctions already in place.
Since the State brought the criminal sanction and the tax in separate proceedings, the Court's analysis should next have addressed
whether the DOR's action violated the prohibition against multiple
prosecutions.
B.

MULTIPLE PROSECUTION PROTECTION

In their dissents, Justices Scalia and O'Connor found no violation
of the prohibition against multiple prosecutions by reasoning that a
civil action following a criminal action is simply not a second jeopardy.
This reasoning arises out of the idea that a civil action, such as the one
initiated by the DOR to collect the tax, never jeopardized the Kurths'
interest in finality.
181 Of course, it is also the province of the Court to determine whether the legislature
may have substantively overstepped its bounds and authorized an unconstitutional punishment. However, such a substantive review falls not within a double jeopardy inquiry, but
rather within a due process or excessive fines inquiry. See infranotes 217 to 226 and accompanying text.
182 1987 Mont. Laws 563. The Preamble states in relevant part:
WHEREAS, dangerous drugs are commodities having considerable value, and the
existence in Montana of a large and profitable dangerous drug industry and expensive
trade in dangerous drugs is irrefutable; and
WHEREAS, the state does not endorse the manufacturing of or trading in dangerous drugs .... but it recognizes the economic impact upon the state of the manufacturing and selling of dangerous drugs; and
WHEREAS, it is appropriate that some of the revenue generated by this tax be
devoted to continuing investigative efforts....
Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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In general, the finality interest represents a defendant's interests
in avoiding the stigma and embarrassment of a second criminal trial
and in avoiding the anxiety and uncertainty of a potential indictment
and trial after an acquittal or conviction.18 5 The DOR's action
threatened neither of these aspects of the finality interest. The State
did not subject the Kurths to the ordeal of a second criminal trial, nor
did any prosecutor attempt to reopen their criminal conviction or try
to obtain a second criminal conviction. Therefore, in a civil action, by
definition, no finality problem arises. Thus, the Blockburger multiple
prosecution test should not apply since it operates only to protect a
finality interest.
However, the complexity of the double jeopardy protection and
the potential vagueness of the labels "criminal" and "civil" may require
a closer look.1 8 6 While the Court noted that a tax differs fundamen-

tally from other types of sanctions, such as civil penalties or civil forfeitures,1 8 7 the "tax" label does not preclude double jeopardy
analysis.' 8 8 As the Supreme Court remarked in United States v. La
Franca,'89 "if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted
into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such." 190
Similarly, the distinction between a tax and a penalty does not
render the Kennedy-Ward test unworkable for purposes of determining
whether the proceeding to collect the tax operates as a civil or criminal action for double jeopardy purposes. Courts employ the KennedyWard standard to determine whether a nominally civil sanction acts as
a punishment by balancing any punitive and non-punitive purposes of
the sanction. 19 1 The Supreme Court originally couched the test in
terms of punitive purposes and non-punitive purposes, not in terms of
punitive and remedial purposes. 192 In part because courts have
largely applied the test only to civil penalties and civil forfeitures,
whose non-punitive purpose is remedial, case law applying the test has
often erroneously equated the term "non-punitive" with "remedial." 19 3
See supra notes 20 to 25 and accompanying text.
186 Indeed, Justice Scalia retreated from his stance that a civil action is simply not a
second jeopardy to address the idea that the label "civil" may not be determinative. He
recognized, perhaps, that this stark proposition would allow a legislature to effect any multiple prosecution merely by calling it "civil." Id.
187 Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994).
188 Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561 (1922) (stating that "[t]he mere use of the word
,tax' in an act primarily designed to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that
within the true intendment of the term a tax was laid").
189 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
185

190 Id. at 572.

191 See supra notes 38 to 42 and accompanying text.
192 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
193 See, e.g., Sorensen v. State, 836 P.2d 29, 32 (Mont. 1992).
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A remedial purpose is one type of non-punitive purpose. Another non-punitive purpose, for example, is revenue raising, which is
the purpose of a tax.'9 By substituting this purpose into the KennedyWard equation, courts can still evaluate the tax proceeding, notwithstanding the objection that the tax itself serves no remedial purpose.
Therefore, the Kennedy-Ward test also places constraints on a proceeding to collect a tax when it follows a criminal prosecution.
In applying the Kennedy-Ward test to determine the nature of the
tax, a court must first ask whether the legislature has indicated, either
expressly or impliedly, that the label "civil" or "criminal" should apply
to the tax. In Helvering v. Mitchell,' 9 5 another multiple prosecutions
case, 196 the Court addressed this same matter of statutory interpretation.19 7 That case involved a civil penalty, assessed for tax fraud pursuant to section 293 of the Revenue Act of 1928, following the taxpayer's
acquittal in a criminal fraud case brought pursuant to a separate section of the Revenue Act.198 The Court found that in enacting section
293, Congress had intended to create a proceeding for the collection
of a civil penalty, not a criminal one. 19 9 As evidence of this intent, the
Court noted that Congress had provided for collection of the penalty
by distraint, a distinctly civil procedure. 20 0 Similarly, Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax also provides that the DOR may collect the tax by
distraint.20 ' The presence of this distinctly civil collection procedure
indicates that Montana's legislature intended to use the "civil" label to
2
describe the tax. 02
Next, a court must examine the seven factors enumerated in Kennedy to determine whether the nature of the action may negate the
implied intention of the legislature. 203 First, the state does not subject
194 Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994). See
also United States v. Lipke, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922).
195 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
196 The Court's opinion frequently makes use of the terms "punishment" and "sanction," but since Mitchell had been acquitted at the criminal trial, the civil sanction imposed
could not have been a second punishment. Instead, the taxpayer argued that the proceeding was an unconstitutional second prosecution. Id. at 398-99.
197 Id. at 399.
198 Id. at 395-96.
199 Id. at 401-02.
200 Id. In the drug tax context, "distraint" or "distress" refers to a seizure of personal
property of the offender as remuneration for wrongful conduct for the benefit of the injured party. BLAcKas LAw DJCrIONARY 474 (6th ed. 1990).
201 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-115 (1993).
202 For an examination of the Act's Preamble to find that the legislature intended the
tax to be "civil," see Sorensen v. State, 836 P.2d 29, 31 (Mont. 1992) (concluding that the
Act passed the first part of the Kennedy-Ward test).
203 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). For a description of the seven
Kennedy factors, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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the taxpayer to incarceration or other restraint under the provisions
of the Dangerous Drug Tax, so it imposes no "affirmative disability or
20 4
restraint upon the taxpayer."
Second, although drug taxes are a relatively recent innovation at
the state level, courts have not historically regarded them as punishment. As noted, at least twenty-six states have enacted drug taxes of
some sort. 2 05 Only two state supreme courts have struck down their

states' drug taxes as unconstitutional.2 06 In both cases, the courts held
the taxes invalid, not as second punishments, but rather on self-in20 7
crimination grounds.
Third, Montana does not predicate liability for the tax on a finding of scienter. Indeed, even the underlying crime of criminal possession of dangerous drugs requires no scienter.2 0
Fourth, the tax obviously serves the traditional retributive and deterrent goals of criminal law. Similarly, the tax applies to behavior
which the state already punishes as a crime, namely the possession of
dangerous drugs.
Despite serving the retributive and deterrent purposes of punishment, the tax does serve a valid non-punitive aim-revenue raising.
Whether the tax acts as an excessive sanction in relation to this revenue-raising purpose requires an examination of similar revenue raising taxes. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent in Kurth
Ranch, other states have commonly employed the same tax rate in
2 09
their drug taxing systems.

Thus, of the seven factors set forth in Kennedy, Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax fails only the fourth and fifth factors. This hardly supplies "the clearest of proof' required by Ward to find that the tax
procedure acts as a criminal prosecution by nature.2 1 0 Therefore,
since the DOR's proceeding to collect the tax does not qualify as a
second criminal prosecution, the proceeding did not violate the
21
Kurths' double jeopardy multiple prosecutions protection. '
204 Sorensen, 836 P.2d at 31.
205 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
206 State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888 (Idaho
1991). For federal case law upholding drug taxes, see United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S.
42, 44 (1950) (holding that "a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed").
207 Roberts, 384 N.W.2d at 691; Smith, 813 P.2d at 890.
208 Sorensen, 836 P.2d at 32.
209 Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (1994)

(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
210 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
211 Justice Scalia reached the conclusion in Kurth Ranch that the tax proceeding was not
a criminal prosecution, although he did so without examining the Kennedy factors in detail.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION BEYOND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Rather than addressing separately the rules related to multiple
punishments and multiple prosecutions, the Court further obscured
the punishment-prosecution distinction and conflated the rules governing each. Finding the stringent multiple prosecutions test insurmountable, the Court pursued only the multiple punishments issue.
However, the letter of the Hunter analysis protects against multiple
punishments only insofar as they exceed that which the legislature has
authorized. The Court found this level of protection too low for its
purposes and thus set out to enhance the scope of the Hunter test by
selectively including among its ranks the fourth, 2 12 fifth,2 13 and seventh 2 14 factors of the Kennedy-Ward multiple prosecutions standard.
The Court correctly noted the lack of protection afforded to multiple punishments through the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
Huntertest. This perception does not, however, justify the reconstructive surgery it has performed on Hunter, since other Constitutional
protections augment the multiple punishment protection.
For example, the Due Process Clause, like the Hunterrule,assures
that sentencing courts may only impose sentences which the legislature has authorized.2 1 5 Also, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and
Excessive Fines Clauses of the Eighth Amendment place limits on the
substance of what punishments the legislature may authorize. 2 16
Statutes similar to Montana's drug tax provisions have been attacked as violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive fines.2 1 7 Recently, courts have referred to the Excessive
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1960 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212 Whether the proceeding promotes the traditional aims of criminal law may indicate
that the purported civil action is criminal in nature. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
213 Whether the proceeding applies to behavior that the state has already criminalized
may indicate that the purported civil proceeding is criminal in nature. Id.
214 Whether the proceeding acts as an excessive sanction in relation to its non-punitive
purpose may indicate that the nominally civil proceeding is criminal in nature. Id. at 169.
215 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689-90 n.4 (1980) (noting that "[t]he Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, would presumably prohibit state
courts from depriving persons of liberty or property as punishment for criminal conduct
except to the extent authorized by state law.").
216 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989). The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive ball
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIHI.
217 In Austin, the government initiated a civil forfeiture action after the defendant had
pleaded guilty to drug offenses. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. The Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to the civil forfeiture suit, but declined to formulate a standard
for determining excessiveness. Id. at 2812. The Court instead relied on the judgement of
the trial court. Id- But see Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 268 (limiting the application of the
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Fines Clause more frequently with respect to civil fines and penalties.21 8 In Browning-Ferris Industry of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal,21 9 the
Supreme Court examined the nature of the Eighth Amendment's protection and concluded that its overall purpose is to limit the government's power to punish. 22 0 More specifically, the Excessive Fines
Clause is supposed to limit the government's ability to extract pay221
ments as punishment for an offense.
Justice O'Connor has suggested a standard for the application of
the Excessive Fines Clause in the civil context which parallels the standard used in a cruel and unusual punishment analysis in the criminal
setting.2 2 2 According to Justice O'Connor, in deciding whether a

sanction violated the Excessive Fines Clause, a court must first give
2 23
great deference to the legislature which authorized the sanction.
Second, the court should examine the gravity of the conduct in relation to the harshness of the sanction. 22 4 Finally, the court should
compare similar civil and criminal sanctions imposed in the same jurisdiction for different conduct and the sanctions imposed in other
2 25
jurisdictions for the same conduct.
As in Halper, the sheer magnamity of the tax that the DOR imposed on the Kurths disturbed the Court. Rather than applying the
Excessive Fines Clause to address the proportionality of the tax, the
Court continued the distortion of the Double Jeopardy Clause which
it had begun in Halperto find the tax unconstitutional. By adopting
Justice O'Connor's excessive fines analysis, the Court would have been
able to weigh the magnamity of the offense against that of the sanc22 6
tion to reach a more satisfying result.

Excessive Fines Clause to "those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government"
and not to a private party as punitive damages).
218 While historically, courts have applied the Eighth Amendment only in the criminal
context, the Court's holding in Halper, that the labels "criminal" or "civil" may not be
dispositive, seems to extend the Excessive Fines Clause to the civil arena. See also Austin,
113 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (noting that the text of the Eighth Amendment, unlike the Fifth

Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment, contains no language limiting its application to the criminal context).
219 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
220 Id. at 275.

221 Id. at 265 (quoted in Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805).
222 Id. at 300-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 301 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
224 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
225 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
226 The Bankruptcy Court had summarily dismissed the Kurths' excessive fines arguments because the DOR had not assessed the tax in a criminal proceeding. Kurth Ranch v.
Department of Revenue of the State of Mont., 145 B.R. 61, 76 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
However, the court erroneously emphasized the form over the substance of the proceeding
by relying entirely on the "civil" label to determine the nature of the action, without examining its underlying goals. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-47 (1989) (hold-
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CONCLUSION

The Court evaluated the Dangerous Drug Tax's obvious deterrent purpose and its high tax rate assessed following arrest on goods
the taxpayer no longer owns to conclude that the tax violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Had the Court resorted to excessive
fines analysis, it would have reached the same result. The major flaw
with the Court's application of double jeopardy analysis is that it left
open the possibility that taxes of the same magnitude could have been
constitutional if only the state had assessed them in the same action as
the criminal prosecution. 227 Similarly, the Court's analysis could lead
to the invalidation of a criminal sentence where the state had already
imposed a civil tax.2 28 Application of the Excessive Fines Clause

avoids both of these problems. Regardless of the timing of the action
under which the state assesses the tax, and regardless of whether there
had been a criminal prosecution, the tax would fail if excessive in relation to the offensive conduct As seen in this light, the Kurth Ranch
decision compounded the confusion initiated by Halperand laid the
groundwork for future Supreme Court headaches.
JOHN HILDY

ing that, in making the assessment of whether a civil penalty may constitute a criminal
punishment, "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance"). Given
that a state legislature could attempt to mask any criminal action behind a "civil" label, the
excessive fines analysis should still apply.
227 See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

